RECENT CASES
ACCORD AND SATISF.TION-ATTORNEY

AND CLIENT-An attorney. having

collectcd a clain for his client, remilted him a cheque for the proceeds less
thirty-three per cent. retained as a fee. The remittance was accompanied

by a notice that it was sent in full settlement of the claim. In an action by
the client against the attorney, to recover a portion of the sum retained.
wrongfully as alleged, it was held that the acceptance of the cheque did not
constitute an accord and satisfaction, although there was a bona fide dispute concerning the amount of the fee. and consequently of the sum due.
Wolfe v.Mack. 142 N. Y. S. 433 (1913).
It is well settled that the acceptance of a cheque purporting to be in full
ettlement of an unliquidated debt. operates as an accord and satisfaction.
Hutton v. Stoddard. 83 Ind. :39 ti883); Brown v. Symes. 31 X. Y. S. 629
(0495) - Tompkins v. Hill, 145 Mass. 379 (I"); Myers v.Green. 21 Ind.
.\pp. I,. (189). And this is ,o. even if creditor accepts the cheque protesting that it is not in full settlement. Fuller v. Kemp. t38 N. Y.231 1189 );
Potter v. DMoglas, 44 Conn. 541 (i$;8); Tanner v. 1crrill, :08 Mich. vS
1z896).

lin the principal case the relation the attorney bore to his client was
fiduciary. Does this authorize the court to depart from the rule applicable in
usual debtor and creditor cases' Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser. 51 X. E.
,6 (N. Y. i8S). and General Fireproof Construction Co. v.Butterfield, it.
-. Y. 407 (1592). answer this question in the affirmative. In the former
case the court said: "The money belongs to the client absolutely and it does
not lie in the attorney's mouth to say 'Isend you an amount which I concede
is yours, but if you take it you must acknowledge that you are not entitled
to any part of the money that I have retained: "
These decisions are in harmony with the scrutinizing and suspicious
attitude of the courts towards contracts between a trustee and his beneficiary. Perry on Trusts (6th ed.). 313 et seq.
A similar transaction occurred between parties in a fiduciary relationship. Ostrander v. Scott. 161 I1. .339 (Fg96). executor and legatee; and
Vermont State Baptist Church v.Ladd. 58 Vt. 95 (,886). principal and agent.
Put the court treating them as the ordinary debtor and creditor cases made
no distinction.
IIA Ks-CIIEQVEs-DEATK or D.AwR-The rule that an aget's
authority is revoked by the death of the principal does not apply to the payment of a cheque by a bank without knowledge of the drawer's death.
Glennan v. Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Co.. to2 N. E. Rep. _
(N. Y. 1913).
There seems to be practically no cases dealing ith the question of law
here involved, the authority upon which the principal case was decidedRogerson v. Ladbroke, C. P. i Bing. 93 (Eng. 1822)-being nearest in point.
There are numerous dicta, however. supporting the principal advanced.
National Commercial Bank Y. Miller & Co., 7- Ala. 168 (1884); Fordred r.
Seamen's Savings Bank, to Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 42_, (N. Y. 18;t); Drum v.
Benton. 13 App. D. C. 24 (t898). The text writers seem to have accepted
the principle as settled law. 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, p. 81; Morse on
Banks and Banking. §400: Tiedeman on Commercial Paper. §448; Chitty on
Bills (tith ed.). p. _'98; Edwards on Bills and Notes, §739; Daniel on 'Negotiable Instruments. §16i8b. All of these writers cite for authority the case
of Tate v. Hilbert. 2 Ves. Jr. i8 (Eng. 1793). It is doubtful whether this
decided the point in question.
If the bank pays after notice of the death of the drawer, it does so
without authority and at its peril. In England the Bills of Fxchange Act.
(55)
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45 & 46 Vict., c. 61, s. 75 (1882), provides that "the duty and authority of a
banker to pay a cheque drawn on him by a customer are determined by notice
of the customer's death." In the United States the same result has been
reached by judicial decision. Bank v. Williams, 13 Mich. 282 (865) ; Simmons v. Cinn. Savings Society; 5 Ohio Dec. (Reprints) 527 (1877); Weiand's
Admr. v. State Nat. Bank. 1i2 Ky. 310 (igor).

The opposite conclusion was

reached in Lewis v. International Bank, 13.Mo. App. 2o2 (1883). but in that
case a cheque was considered an appropriation or assignment of so much
of the fund on deposit-a view which is against the weight of authority.
The "gift" of a cheque by the donor himself has been held not to be
valid unless acted upon in the donor's lifetime. Harris v. Clark. 3 N. Y.
93 (184o: Bank v. Williams. supro; Hewitt v. Kaye. L R. 6 Eq. i98
(Eng. i86); Beak v. Beak, L R. 13 Eq. 489 (Eng. 1872); Walter v. Ford,
74 Mo. 195 (i881); Pullen v. Bank, 138 CaL 169 (i9o2). There are some
cases contra, where the intentinu of the drawer to transfer a present interest
has been clearly evident. Bcuts v. Ellis, 17 Beav. 121 (Eng. 1853); Rolls v.
Pearce, 5 Chan. D. 730 (Eng. 1877); May v. James, 87 la. 189 (893).
B.%.cxs--L.%m~
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'Morgan v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co., tot X. E. Rep. (N. Y. 1933). a
bookkeeper after extracting the forged cheques from the paid vouchers
returned by the bank handed the remainder to his employer, who compared
them with the stubs in the cheque book without using the cheque list. Held:
The bank was relieved from liability by the negligence of the employer in
not exercising due care in the verification of the pass book and cheques.
The well settled rule that the payment of forged or altered cheques by
a bank is done at its peril applies stringently in cases which involve no
other elements. Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 38o (i-9o): Hatton v. Holmes.
97 Cal. 208 (1893): Kobre v. Corn Exchange Bk.. 139 X. Y. S. 89o (1913);
but does not apply where the customer's negligence has furnished the opportunity for the fraud which deceived the hank; Burnet WVoods Savings Co.
v. German Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio Dec. ;.,.)o (1895); Land Title
& Trust Co. v. Northwestern Blank. 1'j6 Pa. 23o (19oo): nor where the facts

are such as estop the cultomer. DeFercit v. Batik of America. 23 La. Ann.
310 (1871): McllenrY v. Ol Citizrns" Xational Bank, 0r X. E. Rep. 305
(Ohio. 1911).

It is now well estalbli'had that a hank is relieved from liability ly the
negligence of a cu:.totner. Chamlion Ice Mfg. Co. v. American Bomding Co..
115 Ky. 63 t t03): Suodgrass v. SwOetser. 44 . F- Rep. 648 (Intl. 1k96).
Yet courts differ as to what constitutes negligence. If a depositor has
neglected the duty of making a reasonable verification of the returned
cheques, lie must suffer all losses resulting from the paYmeut. Frank v.
Chemical Nat'l Bk. 84 X.
. -'o) (18,):
Leather Mfrs: Bk. v. Morgan,
117 U. S. 96 (1886) : Wind v. Fifth Nat. Bk.. i9 Mo. App. 72 (8go). 'Moreover, the verification must be made within a reasonable time. Cincinnati
National Bank v. Creasy, 18 Wkly. Law Bul. 410 (Ohio. 1887): and -upon
discovery of any forgery it is not only the duty of the depositor to notify
the bank- immediately, but to return the cleujucs as soon as possible. U. S.

v. National Ex. Bk. 45 Fed. Rep. 163 (891): Van Wert Xat! Bk. v. First
National Bank. 6 Ohio Cir. Rep. 1.3o (1892). But if the depositor has made
a prudent inquiry he is not lialle for the forgery. Shipman v. State Bank.
x_6 N. Y. 318 0890.
CONTRAcrs-PcBLIc PoLtcv-SHERiFPs-The promise of a property owner
to a sheriff to pay a stipulated amount for suppb'ing deputies to protect his
property from strikers is vc.id as against public policy. if there is any profit
to the sheriff in the transaction. Shields v. Latrol.e-Connellsville Coal & Coke
Co.. 86 AtI. Rep. S4 (Pa- 19t3).
A sheriff is entitled for the performance of his duty only such compensation as the law allows. Burk v. Webb, 32 Mich. 173 (1875); Crofut v.
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.lundt. 46 How. Prac. 481 (\.

Y. 1874). What compensation a sheriff shall
je allowed in the hiring of deputies has largely been regulated by statute
ir the several jurisdictions. In the absence of a statutory provision he cannot recover for the service of deputies ftrnished by him. Decatur Co. v.
Le-man, 73 Kans. 785 (igo6); Beck v. Board of Supervisors of Erie Co..
53 '. Y. Supp. 156 (1898); contra, Witdmiller v. People, ;8 .Ill. App. 273

It is well settled that a promise to pay a public officer special compensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do is without consideration and against public policy. Worthen v. Thompson. 54 Ark. 11 (i8gi) ;
Adams Co. v. Ilunter. 78 Ia. 328 (18qo); Lancaster Co. v. Fulton. 1.8 Pa.
48. lowever. a promise to a public officer to pay compensation for doing
that which is without the scope of his official duty is enforceable. Studley
v. Ballard, 4; N. E. 1ooo (Mass. 1897) ; Texas Cotton Press & .Mfg. Co. v.
Mechanics Flre Co., 54 Tex. 319 (881); Providence & A. Turnpike Co. v.
City of Scranion, t7o Pa. St. xt4 (1895).
Accordingly, sheriffs can recover from the promisor, provided they were
n,1t compelled ;o hire deputies and have not been gainers in the transaction.
Sullivan v. Utah & N. Ry. Co., 11 Mont. -236 (z8) ) ; McCandless v. Allegheny Bcs-emer Steel Co.. 152 Pa. 139 t tf). ) ; Clark v. Cork, 14 Pa. Sup. Ct.
1"9 (t9oo).
CONi0
T'TS--RFsRAIxT OF .AIA(.E-\ promise by a mai to an utnmarried woman that if she remained in his service, attended to his wants, and
refrained from marrying until after his death, his executor would then pay
her a specified sun.. was held an agreement in restraint of marriage and void
as against public plicy. Although in such contract the performance of the
service is legal, yet ;ince the consideration is not severable the entire contract
is vitiated. Lowe v. Doremus. 87 AtI. Rep. 459 (N. J. 1913).
The case follows the rule already established in Sterling v. Sinnickson,
5 N. J. L 756 (lSqo), where it was held that a scaled bill providing for
payment if the obligee did not marry for six months was invalid, on the
ground that the law regards marriage as at the foundation of the social
order and hence removes every unreasonable restriction "upon the freedom
of choice and of action in a case where the law wills that all shall be free."
It is in accord with early and modern Engliih and American authorities.
Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215 (I6&o) ; Hartley v. Rice. to East. 22 (Eng. 8o8) ;
Conrad v. Williams, 6 ill 444 (N. Y. 1845) ; Shafer v. Senseman, 125 Pa.
3io (ile:9) ; Arthur v. Cole. 56 Md. too (i88i).
A wager by a person that he will not be married within a certain time
is illegal. Chalfont v. Payton, 91 Ind. -62 (t884). But the general rule
does 3iot apply to the promises of Shakers not to marry while they continue members of the Society; Waite v. Merrill, 4 NMe. io2 (m85); nor to
a promise by a husband to pay for the support of his divorced wife as long
as she does not marry. Jones v. Jones, 27 Pac. Rep. 85 (Colo. z89i). A
contract of marriage is not illegal as being in restraint of marriage, although
restraining the parties thereto from marriage with any other parties. Brown
v. Odill. 52 L. R. A. 66o (Tenn. igoo). But a covenant not to marry any
person but the covenantee is unenforceable. Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225
(Eng. 1768).
Notwithstanding that the plaintiff can not maintain an action on the
express contract, she is entitled to recover quantunt mcruit for work and
labor. Papineau v. White, x7 Ill App. 51 (19o4), and see King v. King, 59
N. E. Rep. it (Ohio, igoo), where recovery under a contract similar to the
principal case was allowed.
D.,.%rc,r.s-D.AY
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boxes crop apples," does not obtain informantion of the possible damages
which may arise from a delay in their delivery and is consequently not liable
for special damages. Stone v. Postal Tel. Co.. 87 A.tl Rep. 319 (R. 1. 1913)
The decision is based on the rule stated by Baron Alderson in Hadley v.
Baxendale. 9 Ex. 353 (Eng. i854). that the damages recoverable for breach
of contract ought to be "such as may fairly and reasonably be considered
either naturally arising from such breach of contract itself or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both p;rties at
This principle has been uriversally
the time they made the contract.
approved and followed IKth in this country and in England, particularly as
applied to claims for special damages against telegraph companies for negligence in transmitting messages. Baldwin v. Telegraph Co.. 45 X. Y. 744
(187s): Primrose v. Telegraph Co., ;54 V. S. t (893):

Postal Tel. Co. v.

Lathrop. 1.31 Ill. 575 (i8go): and against common carriers for negligence in
shipping goods. Brock v. Gale. T4 Fla. 523 (1874 ; Mather v. American
Express Co., 138 Mass. 5 (884.
Though accepting the general rule of the Hadley case. supra, courts are
not entirely in accord as to what constitutes suffictent indication of the importance of a mcssage to give notice of the possibility of pccial damages
within the rule. A nic.-sage in cirher does not give such notice. Caudee v.
Telegraph Co.. 34 Wis. 471 t 187'4): 'rimrose v. Telegraph Co..-supra; Wheelock v. Cable Co.. zinj, Mass. 119 (W908). It has been held that the company
innut be expressly informed of the special circumstances which might give
rise to special damages. Primrose v. Telegraph Co.. su.ara; Wheelock v.
Telegraph Co.. supra: Candee v. Telegraph Co.. supra. Contra to this, other
courts have ihld that the mere fact of notice that a business transactio)n is
contemplated is sufficient to enable the sender to charge the company with
all pecuniary loss resulting from negligence in transmission. Fererro v.
Telegraph Co. 9 App. V. C 455 (8g6); Postal Tel. Co. v. Lathrop. supra.
Dis50R1,L" HOr'SE-EVIDE.CE oF RFPrTATiox- n a prosecution for
keeping a house of ill-fame. it was held competent to introduce evidence that
the house had. in its neighborhood, the general reputation of being a place
to which lewd persons of both sexes resorted for the purpose of unlawful
sexual itercourse. Putnam v- State. T32 Pac. Rep 916 tOkla. tot3). The
court said that the old common law doctrine, that the reputation of a house
could not be proved, was inadequate to check the social evil of today; under
such a rule it would be practically impossible to convict the keeper of a
disorderly house. Cf. Wigmore, 2 Evidence. 621.
The authorities are divided on this question. In accord with the principal case are Sylvester v. State. 42 Tex. 496 (287'5); Sprague v. State. 44
S. W. Rep. 837 (Tex. i898); [Bets v. State. 93 Ind. 375 (1883): State v.
Bresland, _-9 Minn. 28i (1894); Howard %. People. 27 Colo. 396 (1900):
•McConnell v. State. 58 S. E. Rep. 546 (to,).
On the other hand. in Parker v. People. 94 1l. App. 648 (igoo). it was
said #hat in most of the states where evidence of the general reputation of
the house is admitted, such admission is based upon the wording or requirements of the statute, as in King v. State. 1;7 Fla. 183 (18;9); State v. Lee.
8o Ia. 75 (j89o) ; or else the courts are led by the use of the word "ill-fame"
to conclude that the reputation is a part of the crime. Cf. Wharton, Criminal Evidence. 261. The gist of the action is in the "use." and not in the
"'reputation," of the house. State v. Boardman, 64 3Me. 523 (1874); Parker
v. People, supra; State v. Lyon, 39 Ia. 379 (1874).
The authorities agree that the general reputation of the inmates ar.d
visitors may be proved to show the character of an alleged bawdy house,
then as the house gets its reputation from its frequenters and inmates it
iould be permissible to prove that the house itself has acquired the name
of a bawdy house. Commonwealth Y. Murr, 42 %V. N'. C. -63 (Pa. 1898).
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HUSBIAxD AND WIFE-CCVEYAxCE

BY HUSBAND TO WIFE-V.ALIDITY-

A husband, in contemplation of leaving the state to escape being drafted
during the Civil War. executed a deed to his wife in consideration of love
and affection to provide for her support in his absence. Held: There was
no fraud, and it will be upheld in equity as a provision for the wife. Thomas
v. Hornbrook. 1o2 N. E. Rep. 198 (111. 1913).
The authorities support the doctrine of the principal case. Co. Lit. 3a;
Shepard v.Shepard. 7 Johns. Ch. 57 (N. Y. 1823): Dale v.Lincoln, 62 Ill.
22 (1871); Seno v. Rickets. 33 Ind. 181 (z871); Turner v. Shaw. 96 Mo.
22 (1888).
Under the common law doctrine of merging the identity of husband and
wrife. a husband cannot convey the legal title directly to his wife. Beard v.
Beard. 3 Atk. 72 (Eng. 1744) : Coates v.Gerlach. 44 Pa. 43 (10862); Underhill r. Morgan. 33 Conn. to5 (1866). However. through the medium of a
third person, a husband may make a conveyance indirectly to his wife, i.e..
make an absolute conveyance to the third person, who in turn conveys to

the wife. Arundell v. Phipps. ;o Vcs. Jr. 139 (Eng. 18o4); Whithy v. Duffy.
j35 l'a. 6'-o 08o): Donahue v. Hubbard. 154 Mass. 537 (1891).
The husband may also sue a third person as trustee. conveying the
property to him for the use and benefit of the wife. and thereby vest the
legal estate in the trustee and the equitable estate in the wife. Abbott v.
58 (1837).
Hurd. 7 Blackf. 5to (Ind. 18.) ; Whitcomb v. Sutherland, 18 Ill.
Biy virtue of the Statute of Uses, such a conveyance would vest the legal
c.tate in the wife. Thatcher v. Emans. 3 Pick. S2t (Mass. t,92).
Despite the common law rule. equity may uphold a direct conveyance
fron husband to wife. provided it does not affect the rights of third persons.
Pa. Salt Mfg. Co. v. Xeel, s4 Pa. 9 (866) ; Bancroft v. Curtis. io8 Mass.
47 (1871) ; Moore v. Page. tit U. S. 1; (1883) ; Vough v. Vough, So X. J.
Equity will scrutinize the motives and purposes of the
Eq. 177 (1892).
conveyance: hut when made in good faith, and especially when supported
hv some valuable or meritorious consideration, it will generally be sustained..
Shepard v. Shepard. supra: Bedell's Appeal. 87 Pa. 51o (1878); Smith v.
Seiberling. is Fed. 6,- (t888).
Ilt-Sr.AxD %%p WIFVr.-TiAILITv ON W'IFetS CONTRACTS FOR NCESsARIFu:

Acrxc'-A husband who lives with his wife and either supplies her with
ieces:aries or gives her the money to purchase them is not liable for goods
purchased by her on credit, although they were necessaries. when he has
neither authorized nor ratified her act. McCreery & Co. r. Martin. 87 AtL
Rep. 433 (N. J. 1913).
This opinion is in accordance with the prevailing view and summarizes
the well settled law. Wanamaker v. Weaver, 1-6 N. Y. 75 (igo3); Mord
v. Moreland. 1 K. B. 64 (Eug. 193) ; Baker v. Carter. 83 Me. 132 (1891).
The wife is presumed to have authority to purchase necessaries and the
burden is on the husband to show that the authority did not exist. Bonney
6
v. Pesham. to- Ill. 34 (1882): Bergh v. Warner, 47 .Minn. 25o ('891). The
agency of the wife is a question of fact. arising either from the husband's
neglect to supply her with necessaries, or from the authority expressly given,
or fairly to be implied from the circumstances. Martin v. Oakes. 85 N. Y.
S. 387 (7903).
He may ratify her acts as his agent. Grant v. White, 42
Mo. 285 0868).

A husband is bound to provide for his wife and children whatever is
necessary for their suitable clothing and maintenance, according to his and
their situation in life. Keller Y. Phillips. 39 N. Y. 351 (1868); Hughes v.
Chadwick, 6 Ala. 61 (1844) ; Rea v. Durkee. 25 11. (15 Peck) 503 (1861).
This obligation continues as long as she does not violate her duty as wife.

Cromwell v. Benjamin. 4t Barb. ;g (N. Y. 1864). But if tihe wife lives
apart from her husband. and such fact is known, the husband is not liable
for articles furnished her unless he consented to the separation or had by
his own misconduct induced it.

Rutherford v. Coxe, ii

Mo. .347 (t848);
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Recse v. Chelton, -6 AMo. 398 (i8s8); Belknap v. Stewart, 38 Neb. 304
(j893). If it is unknown to the vendor that the wife is living apart from
her hubband the express agency of the wife to make purchases is not revoked.
M. v. W., 48 N. Y. S. .77 (1897). but the implied agency is revoked. Constable v. Rosener, 81 N. Y. S. 36 (i904).
This obligation of the husband does not extend to goods other than
necessaries. Deradrahan v. Walker, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas. 26, not even to
money loaned to her to buy necessaries. Schwarting v. Bosland, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 7oo (1893), unless at his request. Walker v. Simpson, 42 Am. Dec. 216
(Pa. 1844).
An exception is found in Watts v. Moffett, 12 Ind. App. 399 (z895).
The husband paid all the wife's bills and requested her not to buy on
credit again. She did and husband was liable, as he had not notified the
merchant.
INTERsTATE COMMERCE-Ar

cCUMExr OF C.mt-A sleeping car then in use

ld: The attachin interstate commerce was attached under a state writ.
ment was void, being an encroachment on the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states. Pulman Co. v. LiUncke t al., 2o3 Fed.
Rep. 1017 (1913).
The state courts hare taken conflicting views on this question. The
cases which support the principal case are: Wall v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 5-,
W. Va. 485 (1903); Michigan C. R. IL Co. v. M. L S. R-.R. Co., i IlL
App. 399 (i8;8): Shore Y. B. & 0. R. R. Co.. -6 S. C. 472 (i9o6) ; Seibcls v.
Northern Central R. R. Co., 61 S. E. 435 (S. C. 19o8); Railway Co. v. Forest,
9) Wis. 8o (896).
The courts of other states, reluctant to impede the collection of the debts
of its citizens. hold that in order to invalidate the attachment, it must appear
that the statute authorizing it was framed with the deliberate object to
regulate interstate commerce. DeRochemont v. V. Y. C. & X. R. R. Co., 71
AtL Rep. 868 (N. H. i9o9); Southern Flour and Grain Co. v. N. P. R. R.
Co., 127 Ga. 62-6 (1906); Boss v. Chicago R. 1. & P. R. R. Co., 72 Atd. R.
694 (R. 1. 1910).
There has been no actual decision on this point in the Federal courts,
liut in Davis v. C. C. C. & St. L R. R. Co., 217 U. S. 157 (1909), where

it was decided that the attachment of idle cars of a foreign corporation doing
interstate business was valid, the court intimated that their decision would
have been the same. even if the cars had been actually in use. This is only
dicta, for even those jurisdictions that support the principal case decide that
such an attachment as occurred in Davis v. C. C. C. & St. L R. R., supra, is
valid.
MALcOs PRosM-r1o---EssrAL.s-In Crews v. Mayo. 132 Pac. Rep.
o3z (Cal. 1913), the court in deciding a case of malicious prosecution, observed that "two elements are necessary to sustain an action for abuse of
process: (i) the existence of a bad motive; (2) an act in the use of the
process not proper in the regular employment of the proceeding. Even evil
intentioned use of process, if regular, is not abuse thereof."
This dictum represents the preponderating opinion, subject only to minor
changes in the terminology used. Gonsouland v. Rosomano, j76 F. 481
(La. 19o): Dickerson r. Schwahacher. ;8 So. Rep. 986 (Ala. 1912). "Bad
motive' is defined to be that which contemplates the use of the process after
its issue for a wrongful purpose: Wright v. Harris. -6 S E. Rep: 489
(N. C. 1912) ; Williams Y. Mayor. 73 S. F- Rep. 255 (Ga. 19us), substitutes
"ulterior purpose"; a prior case in the same state, Brantley v. Rhodes, 131
Ga. 2,-6 (1o8), had held that the process must be used "knowingly. wrongfully and unlawfully": see also Mullins v. Matthews. i2z Ga. 286 (igo4).
In Pennsylvania. "unlawful" is sufficient: -MayerY. Walter. 64 Pa. 283 (1870).
On the other hand. it is said in Rogers v. O'Barr. 76 S. AV. Rep. 593
(Tex. 19o.3), that process may wrongfully issue without necessarily being
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unlat jul. A later PeIn:r-vania ca-c adds to "'un1;lwful" either inferential or
actual malice as an e.,ciital: llmnphreys v. Sutcliffe. 19.2 Pa. 336 (1899).
This additinnal Aecment i. generally repudiated: Page v. Cushing. 38 Me. 523
i8Z6t. Biandri v. Leon. i 8 N. Y. S. 386 t19ogP, and Spear v. Pendill, 164
Mich. 6'V (1911). holding that the action lies for the wrongful use of
psroccss, not for inaliciou: ly causing it to issue.
If only one of the two essentials indicated in the principal case :s present.
the action does not lie: Jeffery v. Robbins, 73 Ill.
App. 35 31897), where tile
mi-tive. through ulterior or otherwise, is held immaterial, if the process itself
is regular. Contra: ('Kearuey v. lHolnes. 6 La. Ann. 373 (i85,): -Where
party has used the process of the courts for the sole purpose of harassing
the defendant, without reasonable hope of recovering any portion of such
claim, he is liable for abuse of process, though the suit was an ordinary civil
suit." This unique exception has, however, a strong dissenting opinion.
KEL;Lt
4 E .-- CONTRI BUTORY
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RFQVUKED--In Jacob v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co.. zo2 N. E. Rep. 5i8
N. Y. 1913), a boy of fourteen, was struck and killed by an automobile.
ld: That the fact that the boy was snii
jais did not impose on him the
same duty of care required of an adult, but only that care common and usual
among boys of his age.
This is the general principle applicable to such cases and has been followed in Cunningham v. Illinois Ccat. R. Co., 165 Ill. App. 382 (19z3); Rasnussen v. Whipple, o8 N. E. Rep. 592 (Mass. 1912) ; Moeller v. United Rys.
Co., 147 S. W. Rep. 1oo9 (.Mo. 1912) ; Pierce v. United Gas and Eectric Co.,
ti8 Pacif. Rep. 7oo (Cal. 1911); Knickerbocker v. Detroit G. H. & M. R. Co.,
16; Mich. 596 (ig).
Contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a child under six years of
age; Bay Shore R. Co. v.Harris, 67 Ala. 6 (188o) ; Schnur v. Citizens' Traction Co.. 153 Penna. "9 (893) ; nor, in some jurisdictions, to a child under
.;even. Richard.s'n V. Nelson, 22 11. 254 (£9o5) ; Ollis Y.Huston, etc.. Ry. Co.,
73 S. W. Rep. 30 (Tex. i9o3); McVoy v. Oakes, 9t Wis. 214 (1893).
A child between seven and fourteen is prima facie incapable of exercising judgment and discretion. but evidence may be received to show his
capacity. Birmingham Ry. Light and Power Co. v. Jones, £46 Ala. 277
(9o5"), City of Roanoke v. Shull. 97 Va. 419 (i°g.
But see. contra. Central IL & Banking Co. v. Golden. 96 Ga. 5io 0894), where it is said that
no presumption will arise in favor of an infant between ten and fourteen
in case of moving railroad train.
A boy of fourteen or more is presumed to have sufficient intelligence to
be chargeable with contributory negligence and is usually considered sui
juris. Frauenthal v- Laclede Gaslight Co.. 57 Mo. App. i (i&896f)

v. Perlstein, 76 N-.Y. S. 6_;
Ct R. 229 (19o5).

(9w)

; Murphy
; Columbus Ry. v. Connor, 27 Ohio Cir.

The rule in Tucker Y. X. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., xz4 N. Y. 3o8 (i89t),
states thit there is a rebuttable presumption that an infant under the age
of twelve cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. .4ccord, Hill v. Baltimore & X. Y. Ry. Co., -8 X. Y. S. 134 (£9- ) ; Rolin v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.. 141 X. C. 300 (igo6).

Courts cannot specify any certain age at which a child shall be held liable
for his acts to the same extent as a person of maturity, since the peculiar
circumstances of the case. the knowledge and experience of the particular
child, and his capacity to appreciate danger must be considered. Moeller v.
United Rys. Co.. supra; Cherry v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 145 S. IV. Rep.
837 (Mo. 9t2); Jollimore v. Corn. Co., 86 Conn. 314 (1913); Cole v. Searfoss. 9,- X. E. Rep. 345 (Ind. 1912).
XrGLIrE-CcE-LAB1L1TV nF OE

FOR CONDITION- OF PREMISFS UNDER GENc-

telephone company placed its instrument in a shop under an agreement to share profits from
FRAL COxTROL OF Aco-THFR-Pt.rBLC TELEPHoxE S.TArIO-The
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the intrunieut. The usual public telephone sign was displayed on the outside of
the shop and the tolls collected by the servants of the shopkeeper. The
plaintiff after using the telephone was injured by the faulty condition of the
premises caused by the proprietor of the shop. Held: The shopkeeper was
liable, but the telephone company was not. Sullivan v. New York Telephone
Co., 142 X. Y. S. 735 (1913).
It is clear that the owner or occupier of land who induces others to
come upon it for lawful purposes is bound to use due care with reference
to their presence in the conduct and management of his business thereon.
Bennet v. Louisville & .. R. Co., io2 U. S. s77 (188o) ; Hupfer v. National
Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279 (1902); Samuelson v. Cleveland Iron Co., 49
.Mich. i64 (1882); Clussman v. Long Island R. R. Co, 9 Hun. 68 (N.
Y. 1877).
The liability of the telephone company, under the facts of the principal
case, is doubtful, for, as the court said, no authoritative precedent has been
found. Upon analogous facts it was stated obiter that a telegraph company
was not liable for injuries caused by the defective condition of a platform
maintained by the railroad in whose station the telegraph office was located,
although the plaintiff entered for the sole purpose of sending a telegram.
Clussman v. Long Island R. R., supra.
In Thomas v. Springer, 119 N. Y. Supp. 46o (tgog), a patron of a
theatre was injured through the negligence of a servant of the company
which had hired the building from the defendant for a stipulated percentage
of the receipts, it was held that the theatrical company and the owner of the
building were not copartners, but that the theatrical company was an independent contractor for whose negligence the owner was not liable. In
Laguttata v. Chisholm, 72 N. Y. Supp. 9o5 (i90'), the plaintiff was bitten by
a dog of a tenant whose lease provided that he should receive thirty per cent.
of the proceeds from the use of the premises, the remainder to go to the
landlord. The court held that the tenant was managing the property for himself and the landlord was not liable for his negligence.
P. tIESs-JoI,.oEx OF-VHO MAY Join-The manager of a corporation
fraudulently induced the stockholders to sell their shares to him at less than
their real value, and resold the shares at a profit. Under the S. Car. Code
of Civ. Proc. 1912. 166. providing that all persons having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined
as plaintiffs, the stockholders were permitted to join as plaintiffs in an
action requiring the manager to account for the profits of the transaction.
Black v. Simpson. 77 S. E. Rep. 1023 (S: Car. 19131.
The majority of the court held that the subject of the action was the
consummated scheme of the manager, the trustee, to defraud the stockholders,
the cestuis quc trust; and that the stockholders were all interested in the
relief of an accounting. The minority said, that the suit was on different
contracts of sale. made by different people at different times, and that each
suit demanded a different money judgment.
In Gray v. Rothschild, 48 Hun. 596 (N. Y. T888). the several plaintiffs,
from whom the defendants had fraudulently obtained goods by separate sales
at different times, were not permitted to join under an identical code provision (Code Civ. Proc. 146). The reason assigned, as in the dissenting
opinion in the principal case, was that there was no joint subject of action
and no joint judgment demanded.
There is no inflexible rule as to the joinder of parties and it depends
largely on the discretion of the court when joinder will be allowed. Black v.
Simpson, supra. The courts are divided on allowing the joinder of plaintiffs,
and it is almost impossible to frame any general rules on the question.
Pomeroy: Remedies, a6&
The difficulty is in determining what is "community of interest" in the
subject of action and in the relief demanded. The principle is clear that
such community is necessary to a joinder. Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 29o

RECENT CASES
(1i89 : HelTanis v. Switzer. 24 S. C. 39 (188); American Plate Glass Co.
v. Nicosun. 73 N. E. Rep. 0!5 (Ind. 19o): Vestern Union Telegraph Co. v.
(1897) ; Mining
fluff. 1o2 Ind. 535 (M81): McIntosh v. Zaring. 150 Ind. 3o
Co. v. Bruce. 4 Colo. 293 (1878) ; Faivre v. Gillmanl, 84 Ia. 5'3 (1892) ; Keary
v.. Mutual Reserve Fund. 3o Fed. 359 (1&7) ; Central State lank v. Walker,
7 Kans. App. 748 (1898; Younkin v. Milwaukee Light Co, "112 Wise. 15
( igoi ). In each case the court merely decides that under the facts of that

case comnunity of interest is, or is not, present.

"'PEsovA.L RIUis'" OF WiE-Loss OF CoNoxRTum-A miner who had
been injured through the negligence of his employers was incapacitated for
work during several months. His wife sued the husband's employer for
the loss of consortium. H'id: The tort being an injury inflicted directly on
the husband, to whom the direct cause of action accrued, and the loss of the
wife being merely consequential, it did not amount to a violation of her
"personal rights" within the meaning of the married women's statutes.
Gambino v. Manufacturers' Coal and Coke Co., 158 S. W. Rep. 77 (Mo. 1913).
This case is in accord with the trend of decisions: Feneff v. New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 2o3 Mass. 278 (igo9); Brown v.
Kistleman, 98 N. E. Rep. 631 (Ind. z912); Goldman v. Cohen, 63 X. Y. Supp.

459

(190o).

But where the tort is intentional, as the alienation of a husband's affections,
the wife may recover in her own name for the loss of consortium. Golden v.
Gartleman, 159 I1. App. 338 (1909); Farneman v. Farneman, go X. E. Rep.
775 (Ind. igog) ; Gross v. Gross. 73 S. E. Rep. 96t (W. Va. 1912). These cases
proceed on the theory that the loss to be compensated results from the violation of the "personal rights" of the wife under the married women's statutes;
and as the "'personal rights" of the wife to have the companionship and
support of her husband have been directly invaded, the tort involved is a
wrong perpetrated on her.
PotoPERrY-Asstc.-ME T OF CoxNcExr I.VTEaXsTs--A testator devised his
property, real and personal, to his daughter for life. remainder to his son
should he be living at the death of the daughter, but should the son be
dead at the time, to his then living children share and share alike. Held:
The estate of the son and his children was such as could be assigned and
therefore will pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. Clark v. Grosh c al.,o14
N. Y. Supple. 966 (1913).
Recent decisions uphold the assignability and alienability of such contingent expectant estates. In National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 App. Div. S36
(N. Y. i9;!), it was held that a future contingent interest in personal property is alienable, the same as a contingent remainder in realty. Accord.
Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66 (1869) : In rc St. John. 5 Am. B. R. i9o (igoo).
At common law contingent interests were not alienable or assignable to
strangers for the same reason that choses in action were not assignable, i. e.,
to prevent maintenance. Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. 47 (Mass. i83);
Smith v. Pendell, 19 Conn. 107 (1848); Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309 (1891).
However, a contingent remainder could be released to a party being in
interest. Sec. 477. Co. Litt. -63 b..: Smith v. Pendell, supra: Miller v. Eiand,
19 N. Y. 384 (18.9) ; Williams v. Esten, 179 I1. 267 (1899).
Practically such interests were assignable, for in order to avoid the strict
rule of law the doctrine of equitable estoppel was invoked. 4 Rent. Comm.
26o;' Robertson v. Wilson. 38 X. H. 48 t 859); Walton v. Follansbee. z3z
Ill. 147 (i8go): Stewart v. Neely. supra. The peculkir condition of society
which gave rise to the common law doctrine of maintenance no longer exists,
and at the present time the doctrine does not prevail except as expressly preserved by statutes. Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff. 3 Cow. 623 (N. Y. 1824);
Sedgewick v. Stanton. 14 N. Y. 289 (1856).
The tendency of the modern authority is to make a distinction where
the contingency is in the uncertainty of the person and where it is merely
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in the uncertaintv of the event, and it is held that if the person who is to
take the remainder is delinitely ascertained, his interest is more than a
mere possibility and may be conveyed. Grayson v. Tyler. 8o Ky. 3-8 (1882) ;
Cummings v. Searns. 16i 'Mass. o6 (1894): but. contra. if the contingency is one both in the time of vesting and of the person. It re Hoadley,
3 Am. B. R. 78o (i9oo). In re Gardner, 5 Am. B. R. 432 (igot), held the
remainder to be inalienable while the precedent life estate is outstanding and
not a property right passing to the trustee.
In a number of the states contingent remainders are alienable under
the statutes authorizing the conveyance of "expectant estates." Defreese v.
Lake, io9 Mid. 415 (x896) ; or "any estate or interest," Brown v. Fulkeram,
125 'do. 400 (1894); or "any interest or claim" in real property. Young v.
Young, 89 Va. 675 ('893).

PROPERTY FiXTVRES--S7Bv
aSTI
D ARTIMES--A tenant, under a lease
which provided that any improvements or additions made by the lessee
should become the property of the lessor, obtained the landlord's consent
to the removal and disposition of a portion of the lighting apparatus at the
tenant s expense and for his profit. provided he should substitute in its place
other similar equipment. The latter could not be removed without rendering the building practically useless as a theatre. I!,ld: The substituted
articles became an accession to the realty and could not be removed. Webb
v. New Haven Theatre Co., 87 At. Rep. 274 (M. Y. i913).
This decision follows the general rule that, even in the absence of any
stipulation in the lease, trade fixtures substituted for essential parts of the
leased premises, but not additions thereto, are not removable. They are
presumed to be permanent additions. E.r parfe Hemenway, 2 Lowell, 496
(Mass. 18;6); Bovet v. Holgratz, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 141 (1893); Fletcher v.
Mc-Millan, io3 Mich. 494 (1894); Ashby v. Ashby. 59 N. J. Eq. q36 (igoo);
Glasgow v. Hill, 29 Pa. Sup. Ct. z22 (19o5) ; Squire v. City of Portland, io6
Me. 234 (i9o9). Undoubtedly this should be the result under the letter of
the lease in the principal case.
To determine what is a fixture, courts seek to ascertain the intention of
the party, this intention being inferred from the nature of the article affixed,
the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure
and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the annexation
has been made. Eaves v. Estes, to Kan. 314 (1872); Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa.
437 (t875); Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 44 Ia. 57 (1876); Hutchins v.
Masterson, 46 Tex. 551 (i8.--7); McLean v. Palmer, 2 Kulp. 349 (Pa. 1882);
Langsten Y. State, 96 Ala. 44 (1891).

Although there must be actual annexation, with an intention to make a
permanent accession to the freehold, it is not necessary that there be an intention to make the annexation perpetual. An intention must exist to incorporate the chattels with the real estate for the uses to which the real estate
is appropriated, and there must be the presence of such facts as do not
lead to. but repel, the inference that it is intended to be a temporary
annexation. Feder v. Van Winkle, 53 N. J. Eq. 37o (1895).
S.LEs-CnA'.rE.S BOLGHT FRO31 A THuim-The owner is not divested of
the title to his property by larceny and a transfer to a purchaser does not
impair the right of the true owner, although acquired in the ordinary course
of trade and in good faith. Reichard v. Hutton, x42 N. Y. Sup. 936 (1913).
This is a corollary of the old maxim, "One cannot confer upon another
more right than he himself holds." and has never been doubted. Buchanan
v. McClain, ito Ga. 477 (igoo); Soltau v. Gerdau, i19 X. Y. 3,9 (i89o).
Even under the Factor's Acts, if property is taken from the owner by
theft the purchaser gains no title, for the Factor's Acts do not apply when
the factor or agent has obtained the possession or documentary evidence of

RECENT CASES
the title by larceny. Soltau v. Gerdau, sittra; Collins v. Ralli, 2o Hun. 246
(N. Y. 188o).
There is. however, an exception to the broad rule as stated in the principal case. Where the stolen property is money or negotiable paper, the
vendee who purchased innocently and for value is protected. Miller v. Race.
i Burr. 452 (Eng. i;,S) : Massachusetts National Bank v. Snow. 187 Mass.
159
;o5 1 I: Manhattan Savings Institute v. New York National Exchange
Bank, 42 App. Div. 147 (N. Y. 189j. If, on the other hand, the purchaser
from a thief gained possession through an unlawful transaction, as gaining.
the true owner can recover in trover or for money had and received. Mason
v. Waite, 17 Mass. 56o 0822).
Anther exception to the rule of the principal case is the English custom
of market overt. This doctrine is very narrow and the least technical defect
in the sale will invalidate the purchaser's title. Market Overt, 5 Co. 83b
(1595). It has never been introduced into the United States. Easton v. Worthington. 5 S. & R. i3o kPa. i8ig); Coombs v. Gorden, 59 Me. 111 (1871);
Griffith v. Fowler, 18 Vt. 39o (1846).
The practical importance of this case is its relation to the pawnbroker
cases. A pawnbroker gains no title to stolen property and can, therefore, hold
no lien upon property pawned by a thief or vendee from a thief. Patton v.
Joliff, 28 S. E. Rep. 740 (IN. Va. 1897) ; Skora v. Miller, 57 X. E. Rep. 264
(Ind. 1900).

TORTS-LiBEL-I.iJt"

TO B'SI.ESs-A newspaper published derogatory

statements about the conduct of the plaintiff's slaughterhouse, thereby injur-

ing his business. Hield: Although the owners of the newspaper had the right

to comnlent upon admitted facts as
method of doing business, they were
about the plaintiff in connection with
true. Schwarz Bros. Co. v. Evening

to the condition of the plant and the
liable for publishing untrue statements
his business which they believed to be
News Pub. Co., 87 At. Rep. 149 (N.

J. 1913).

It is established that a publication affecting one in his profession, business or trade, if false, is libelous per se. and no special damage need be
shown. Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 6o6 (1891); Daily v. De Young. 127 F.
Rep. 491 (0o3); Holland v. Flick. 212 Penna. ao (9o5); International
Text-Book Co. v. Leader Printing Co., i89 F. Rep. 86 (191o): Hinrichs v.
Butts. 133 X. Y. S. 769 (1912); Astrc v. Star Co.. 193 F. Rep. 631 (1912).

To be actionable, defamatory words must prejudice the one, concerning
whom they are published, in the special profession or business ill which he
is actually engaged. People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 149 S. W.
Rep. 1I48 (0o. 1913); Winsette v. Hunt. 53 S. W. Rep. 522 (Ky. i8g9); and
no recovery will be allowed where the libel is in connection with a business
in which the plaintiff has never engaged. Ramscar v. Gerry, N
N. Y. S. 635
(1888).
The libel must be with reference to the plaintiff's business as a connected
series of acts and not one particular transaction, in order that the. plaintiff
can recover without proving special damage. Fay v. Harrington, 1-6 Mzss.
270 (19oo);

Manire v. Hubbard. Ito Ky. 311 (0900r.

If the business is

unlawful no recovery will be allowed. Johnson v. Simonton. 43 Cal. 242
(1872); Dauphin v. Times Pub. Co, Fed. Cas. No. 3584a (1884).
Bona fide communications on any subject in which both the maker and
receiver have an interest or duty are privileged. Young v. Lindstrom, ii
Ill. App. 239 (9o4).
But if the statements are false. the defendant must show
le had reasonable cause for believing them true. .Neeb v. Hope. iii Penna.
145 (1885). And the privilege may be lost if the publication be excessive.
Smith v. Smith, 73 Mich. 445 (1889).
TORTS-MASTER AND SER.ANT-ASSUMPTON oF Risir-Under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (April 22, 1908, c. 149, p. 4), abolishing the defense
of contributory negligence in certain cases, it is intimated that the defense
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of assumption of risk is also denied the defendant. Horton v. Seaboard Air
Li:ie Co.. ;8 S. E Rep. 494 GN. C. 1913).
The basis of the decision is that assumption of risk is a part of contributory negligence and that a law taking away the greater must necessarily deny the lesser. There is support fur the doctrine that contributory
negligence includes assumption of risk in Johnson v. Mammoth Vein Coal
Co., l 14 S. \. Rep. 723 tArk. igoS), which holds that the difference is one
of degree rather than of kind; and in Johnson v. St Paul & Western Coal
Co.. i,6 Vis. 492 (.1906), ,'hich holds that one is a phase of the other. Other
cases, while recognizing a fundamental difference, realize that both may arise
out oi the same facts and become almost undistinguisbhe. Southern Pacific
Co. v. Allen, io6 S. W. Rep. -41 4Tex. 1907); Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. v.
Crotty, 141 Fed. Rep. 913 (19o5).
A strong line of cases. however, maintain that there is a clear distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Assumption of risk
is founded upon contract. while contributory negligence is a rule of tort.
Narramore v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L Ry. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298 (1899) ; St.
Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. Rep. 495 (to3); Choctaw, Oklahoma,
and Gulf R. R. Co. v. McDade (i9o3) ; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind.
607 (19o2). And directly contra to the decision in the principal case are the
decisions holding that assumption of risk may be pleaded under a statute
which abolishes the plea of contriliutory negligence. Barker v. Kansas City,
M. & 0. Ry. Co.. 1-,9 Pac. Rep. 1151 (Kan. 1913); Bowers v. Southern Ry.
Co., 73 S. E. Rep. 6- (Ga. 1912); Freeman v. Powell, t44 S. W. Rep. io33
(Tex. 1912).
As to the converse of the doctrine expressed in Horten v. Seaboard Air
Line, . ipra, the courts are practically unanimous in holding that contributory
negligence is a defense, where, either by statute or decision, the defense of
assumption of risk has been denied. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co.,
"o7 Pa. x98 (igo3); Coley v. N. C. Ry. Co., 12-9 N. Car. .o7 (1go1); Buckner
v. Richmond & D. I. R. Co-, 7a Miss. 873 (1895).
TORTs-THE----TRE-TatErTX
or PAno-.s-The plaintiff purchased a
ticket and was admitted to the defendant's theatre. In compliance with the
request of a performer to handcuff him, the plaintiff went upon the stage,
where the performer addressed him with defamatory language. ield: That
the plaintiff had not ceased to be a patron of the proprietor who was liable
in an action for breach of contract. Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin,
62 So. Rep. 404 (Ala. 1913).
The decision is in accord with cases determining the liability of proprietors of theatres and other places of amusement for their tortious acts
and for those of their employees, committed within the scope of their employment. Joseph v. Bidwell. 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876); Anderson v. Rawlings,
Ohio Cir. Ct. 381 (89) ; Fowler v. Holmes, 3 N. Y. Supp. 816 ( 889) ; Brown
v. Patchellor, -9 R. 1. ii6 (i9o8). In the case of Fox v. Dougherty, 2 V.
-N.C. 417 (Pa. 1876), the plaintiff was injured in consequence of the negligence of trapeze performers, and the manager was held liable, though the
performance was under the entire direction of the acrobats.
When the prescribed admission fee is paid, persons have the right to
assume that a safe place to witness the exhibition has been furnished. Lusk
v. Peck, 132 N. Y. App. Div. 426 (igog). Owners of places of entertainment are bound to use reasonable care to protect patrons from injury. King
v. Ringling. 13o S.W. Rep. 482 (Mo. igio). But they are not insurers. Scott
v. Univ. of .Mich. Ath. Ass., 15z Mich. 684 09o8). Attendants upon performances assume the risk peculiar to the form of amusement. Lumsden v.
Thompson Scenic Ry. Co., 130 X. Y. App. Div. 209 (igog).
Where a person is wrongfully ejected from place of amusement, his
damages are not limited to amount paid for admittance; he will be compensated for the indignity, disgrace, or any other damage sustained. Smith v.
Leo. 92 Hun. z42 (N. Y. x895).

RECENT CASES
Tru-vER AND CONVERION-P0OPFRTY OFExThi.csic \,,ALUE~-TAx RirasThe plaintiff sued in trover to recover certain tax receipts. Held: The action
would lie. The receipts, though without commercial value, were of peculiar
value to the plaintiff as evidence. Vaughn v. Wright, 78 S. E. Rep. 123
(Ga. 1913).

In general, trover may be maintazned or every species of personal property which is subject to private ownership and has value. Nebraska v.
Omaha National Bank. 59 Neb. 483 (8E99).
The property may be of cornmercial value, even though it has no legal value. Gambling machines, though
without legal value, were recoverable in trover, having a considerable commercial value. Edwards v. American Express Company. 121 Iowa, 744 (19o3).
Evidentiary value of the property is sufficient; e. g., cancelled commercial
paper. Pierce v. Gilson. 9 Vt. 2t6 (1837): Stone v. Clough, 41 X. H. 29o
(iS6o): Otisfield v. Mayberry. 63 Me. 197 (1874) ; Brunner v. Griffith, 4 Dist.
640 (Pa. 1894). And although stock itself, being a chose in action, cannot
be recovered in trover, the certificate may. Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa. 4o3
(1871).

Apparently the only type of property which is not sufficiently valuable to
he subject to trover is that which has neither legal, commercial, nor evidentiary
value. Donohue v. IHenr. 4 E. D. Smith. 161 (N. Y. 1855), where the
recovery of letters, valuable only for the purpose of levying blackmail, was
denied, there being no value which the law could recognize. The plaintiff
failed to recover a fraudulent note by an action of trover in Miller v.
Lamery, 62 Vt. 116 (i889).
TROVM

A!D

CONVERIO-StUB3Ecr

OF

CONVERSION-.MA TERIALS

IN

A

DF.oLnmsED Hou'sE-The plaintiff, under his contract, was entitled to the
materials from the house he was employed to demolish. The defendant, owner
of the house, prevented continuance of the work. In an action of trover for
the materials in the portion of the house still standing, it was held the action
would not lie, the materials remaining part of the realty until actually
severed. Melton v. Fullerton-Weaver Realty Co., 142 N. Y. S. 852 (1913).
This case is in accord with the general rule both in England and America,
that trover lies to recover damages for the conversion of personal property.
Buildings of a permanent nature are ordinarily considered part of the realty.
.Mathis v. Dobschultz. 72 Ill. 438 (1874) ; Pangborn v. Insurance Co., 62 Mich.
6.38 (iF6): Ry. v. Bank. 134 Ind. 127 (1892); Robtrts v. Lynn Ice Co.,
187 Mass. 402 (9o5).
Fixtures of this nature do not become personal property until actually severed from the realty. Noble v. Sylvester, 42 Vt. x46
(86kq) : and buildings and fixtures in general, while they remain attached to
the realty, are not the subject of conversion. Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W.
450 (Eng. 1837) : Mackintosh v. Trotter, 3 M. & W. 184 (Eng. 1838) ; Raddin
v. Arnold. i16
ass. o-o 0874): Thweat v. Stamps, 67 Ala. 96 (iSMo);
Darrah v. Baird. tot Pa. 265 (1882) ; Dewitz v. Shoeneman. 82 Ill. App. 323
(10.9 ). This rule, however, does not apply when the fixture or building is
attached to the realty under the agreement between parties that it is to remain
personalty: in such case the thing attached remains personal property, at
least as far as the contracting parties are concerned, and is. therefore, subject to conversion. Russell v. Richards, 1o Me. 429 (1883); Tyson v.
Post. 1o8 X. Y. 217 (8,M).
In the principal case, however, the building was
of a permanent nature and attached under no such agreement.
The dissenting opinion follows an extension of the doctrine of Russell
v. Richards and Tyson v. Post. supra. holding that by the making of the
contract the materials were constructively severed from the realty, and therefore personalty subject to conversion. There are a few cases which support
this view. Johnston v. Philadelphia Mortgage and Trust Co.. T_-9 Ala. 3t5
(19oo), where it was held that fixtures still attached to the realty could be
sold as personalty. provided that the contract was in writing and made with
the same formalities as a conveyance of realty. In Straw v. Straw. 7o Vt.
24o (1897), the fixtures though annexed to the realty were reserved when
the realty was mortgaged and held to be personalty.
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WAF.vpos-Dr..wLx W~EAoN-RAzoit-Under a statute (Miss. Code, igo6,
Par. iio3), making it a misdemeanor to carry any concealed bowie knife,
dirk, butcher knife, pistol or other deadly weapon of like kind. a boy cannot
be convicted for carrying a razor. Brown v. State, 62 So. Rep. 353
(Miss. 1913).

A razor is a sharp instrument for shaving purposes; Scott v. State, 6z
S. W. Rep. 4-'o (Tex. igoi): and has a well linown and specific use to which
it is ordinarily applied and is not known or usually sold as a weapon. State
v. Nelson. 38 La. Ann. 942 (1886).
Guilt in the crime of carrying concealed deadly weapons depends upon the
character of the weapon and the intent with which it is carried. The carrying
of a pistol for harmless purposes does not constitute this offense. State v.
Roberts. 39 Mo. App. 47 (i8go): State v. Brodnax. 91 X. C. r43 (884) ; nor
the carrying of a pistol in order to trade it off; State v. Harrison. 93 N. C.
6o5 (1885): nor the keeping of it for another; State v. Chippey, 33 AtL
Rep. 438 (Del. 1892) ; nor the retention of it to have it cleaned. Boissean v.
State. Y5 S. NV. Rep. i8 (Tex. i89o). However, it was held in Custinger v.
Comm.. 7o Ky. 392 (8;o), that one may be convicted though his purpose
is harmless.
Ordinarily the carrying of a razor would not constitute crime, yet circumstances might tend to show that it was being carried as a weapon. State
v. Larkin. 24 Mo. App. 410 (1887). It would seem. therefore, that there must
be evidence that it was carried as a weapon in order to convict. Nevertheless a razor has been held a deadly weapon. co nonmne. State v. lannucci. 4
Pennewill. 193 (Del. i9o3). However, in this case the statute under which
the indictment was framed alluded to no speific weapons.

